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14. ABSTRACT The immediate post Cold-War era saw a proliferation of failed states in places like Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Liberia, and Kosovo. International intervention, including U.S. participation, was not universally successful. Military action and civilian action must have one goal and work cohesively toward that goal. Unity of effort was an imperative for success. This paper will examine unity of effort between multi-national forces and international civilian structures at the theater operational level in Bosnia and Kosovo; review changes that are underway to organize all instruments of national power to contribute to post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction; and recommend methods to increase effectiveness and efficiency. U.S. involvement in peace operations in the future is unavoidable. These operations will involve both military and civilian roles, as demonstrated by recent history. NSDD-44 authorizes and directs the Department of State to lead the process of interagency involvement in peace operations through the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. S/CRS must continue to evolve and must be given the resources to accomplish the mission. Additionally, it is in the best interest of the U.S. to work in concert with the UN and international partners to build institutions to lead to unity of effort.					
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PEACE OPERATIONS: UNITY OF EFFORT A CRITICAL REQUIREMENT

by

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FS-01 Department of State

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

The immediate post Cold-War era saw a proliferation of failed states in places like Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Liberia, and Kosovo, leading to widespread human suffering. With reluctance, the U.S. participated in numerous peace operations based on humanitarian concern. International intervention, including U.S. participation, was not universally successful. Military action and civilian action must have one goal and work cohesively toward that goal. Unity of effort was an imperative for success. In “Joint Operational Warfare” Milan Vego maintained that unity of effort is a prerequisite for successful performance at all levels and can either be achieved through command or collaboration.

This paper will examine unity of effort between multi-national forces and international civilian structures at the theater operational level in Bosnia and Kosovo; review changes that are underway to organize all instruments of national power to contribute to post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction in an integrated process; and recommend methods to increase effectiveness and efficiency. More attention will be given to the civilian component of peace operations, which has lagged behind the military in building competence.

U.S. involvement in peace operations in the future is unavoidable. These operations will involve both military and civilian roles, as demonstrated by recent history. If these basic assumptions are accurate, then the U.S. is obligated to develop an integrated whole of government approach to participation in peace operations. NSDD-44 authorizes and directs the Department of State to lead the process of interagency involvement in peace operations through the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. To avoid the mistakes made in Afghanistan and Iraq, S/CRS must continue to evolve and must be given the resources to accomplish the mission. Additionally, it is in the best interest of the U.S. to work in concert with the UN and international partners to build the necessary institutions in a manner that result in unity of effort. Unity of effort through collaboration must be the goal at all levels – strategic, operational, and tactical. Only then will peace operations be successful, efficient and effective.

Introduction

Once peace has been restored, the hard work of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction must begin. Military involvement may be necessary to stop a bloody conflict, but peace and stability will last only if follow-on efforts to restore order and rebuild are successful.ⁱ

--National Security Strategy, March 2006

The demise of the Communist bloc brought freedom and democracy to many new countries. Unfortunately, this transformation did not proceed peacefully everywhere. The struggle for power, between rival factions, ethnicities, tribes, and religious groups, turned to armed conflict as each sought to defeat its enemies and control the process of society's transformation. The immediate post Cold-War era saw a proliferation of failed states in places like Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Liberia, and Kosovo, leading to widespread human suffering. Initially, the U.S. Government, lacking agreement, avoided involvement in the resulting chaos and lapsed into a policy of disengagement from the world's failed and failing states. Eventually, the scale of suffering and death, as witnessed on CNN or the nightly news, was too graphic to be ignored. With reluctance, the U.S. participated in numerous peace operations based on humanitarian concern.ⁱⁱ

The past decade of experience in complex contingency operations, from Somalia to Iraq has demonstrated that success requires unity of effort not only from the military but also from across the U.S. government and an international coalition.ⁱⁱⁱ

*--Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era.
CSIS, March 2004*

International intervention, including U.S. participation, was not universally successful. Only through trial and error was success achieved. The two overriding lessons learned by the peace-keeping community were that re-building nations required a broad range of expertise not found in one country or one institution and that integrated action was needed. Without stability and security there could be no transformation, and without national

institutions and reconciliation, there could be no peace. Military action and civilian action must have one goal and work cohesively toward that goal. Unity of effort was an imperative for success. In “Joint Operational Warfare” Milan Vego maintained that unity of effort is a prerequisite for successful performance at all levels and can be achieved either through command or collaboration. While he proposed that unity of command is the sine qua non of military operations, he allowed that with multi-national forces unity of effort is often achieved through collaboration.^{iv}

Not until the U.S. faced the challenges of securing the peace and re-building the nations of Iraq and Afghanistan did the U.S. government recognize that military power alone could not win the peace. There is now a renewed commitment at the senior levels of government to ensure that all instruments of national power are prepared to contribute to actions designed to build enduring peace and prosperity in post-conflict countries. In order to succeed in future peace operations, agencies must be capable of demonstrating unity of effort among themselves, with the U.S. military, multi-national forces, and a multitude of international organizations.

This paper will examine unity of effort between multi-national forces and international civilian structures at the theater operational level during interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo; review changes underway to organize all instruments of national power to contribute to post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction in an integrated process; and recommend methods to increase effectiveness and efficiency through unity of effort. More attention will be given to the civilian component of peace operations, which has lagged behind the military in building competence.

Unity of Effort in Bosnia and Kosovo between Military and Civilian Functions

The peace operations conducted to stabilize Bosnia and then Kosovo involved implementation by military and civilian organizations. It demonstrated various degrees of success to obtain unity of effort through collaboration. In both cases, NATO led the deployed multi-national forces. In Bosnia a sui generis organization, the Office of the High Representative, was created to implement the civilian efforts; and in Kosovo the UN had the civilian implementation role. Comparison of these two operations will provide unique insight into the evolution of military-civilian collaboration focusing on differences in the civilian institutions and their collaboration with the NATO military structure. While there is much to be critiqued, the focus will be on those actions that contributed to or countered unity of effort between the military and civilian operations.

The Dayton Peace Accords provided the overarching framework for implementation of the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Annex 1 authorized NATO to establish a multi-national military implementation force of NATO and non-NATO forces operating under the NATO Chain of Command, to be known as IFOR. The Office of the High Representative (OHR) was created under Annex 10 to supervise implementation of the civil aspects of Dayton. It was not until a meeting of the contact group in December 1995 that the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) and a Steering Board consisting of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, and the Presidency of the European Union, the European Commission, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), represented by Turkey, was created. The PIC provided policy and political guidance to the OHR.^v The PIC is not a standing body, only meeting a few times a year.

Unity of effort requires that there is a clear, shared vision of the goals, a cohesive plan to reach those goals, and institutions to manage implementation at all three levels - strategic, operational, and tactical. Yet in this case the guidance contained in the Dayton Accords actually set the stage for inconsistent unity of effort. The lack of a standing governing body to oversee the military and civilian implementation, guide the process and resolve any conflicts or discord, resulted in two commands without any unifying elements. NATO was ready to quickly deploy and had troops on the ground by December 1995. The staffing and funding of the OHR, though, was slow. There was a significant period in which it was unable to meet the expectations of the population to implement transformation.^{vi} NATO planned for some type of deployment to Bosnia for months, while OHR had no opportunity to conduct prior planning.

Annex 1A directed the High Representative and the IFOR commander to remain in contact and to establish liaison relationships to carry out their respective authorities. Dayton explicitly stated that the High Representative had no authority over IFOR and was not to interfere in military operations or the IFOR chain of command.^{vii} Additionally, the High Representative had no authority over other civilian agencies, such as the UNHCR, OSCE and others. While the weak organization on the civilian side had no initial impact on the military implementation, it caused the extension of the IFOR, due to the inability of the civilian operation to meet political goals.

The military and civilian structures adjusted over time. Civil-Military Cooperation Centers were instituted in an ad hoc and decentralized manner. The extent to which they developed and the level of support provided to the civilian structures was left to the purview of the individual multi-national division commanders. There was no guidance, no direction,

and no doctrine for coordinating civil-military cooperation at the strategic or operational level in order to de-conflict or synchronize implementation. The coordination and integration that did occur was based on the personalities and the professionalism of those leading.^{viii} In December 1997, the PIC finally recognized that progress on the civilian side would continue to move at glacial speed unless the High Representative had authority, at least over local national officials. The decision of the PIC, which became known as the “Bonn Powers,” authorized the High Representative under the provisions of Dayton to remove officials for anti-Dayton activities and to impose decisions necessary for progress.^{ix} There was still no existing body to oversee both civil and military structures, but by this time personnel on the ground had worked out their own arrangements.

International community intervention in Kosovo faced a completely different set of challenges than those in Bosnia in stabilizing the security situation and implementing civilian administration. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244, adopted by the Security Council on June 10, 1999, authorized a multi-national force (KFOR) to implement the security aspects and a Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRGR) to institute an interim civil administration. UNSCR 1244 set the tone for KFOR and the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) collaboration by directing the SRSG to coordinate closely with the security presence to ensure that they operated toward the same goals and were mutually supportive. The international security forces were to support and coordinate with the international civilian presence.^x This approach supported a more unified effort between the military and civilian implementers.

Overall, the relationship between KFOR and UNMIK demonstrated a quantum leap forward in civil-military cooperation in a multi-national peace operation. The greatest

challenge to overall implementation of UNSCR 1244 was the lack of a clear end-state for Kosovo, because there was no political agreement on status. There were tasks to accomplish but no articulation of a final outcome.

Once again the civilian element had limited time to develop a comprehensive plan, recruit qualified personnel, and mobilize resources and funding. The responsibilities assigned to UNMIK were wide ranging, encompassing all institutions of a civil society. In effect, they were building a nation from ground zero.^{xi} According to Jock Covey in *The Quest for Viable Peace*, the United States, having learned from Bosnia, had engaged in early planning, providing a draft plan to the UN Secretariat.^{xii} A UN assessment team submitted a plan to the UN within 30 days.^{xiii} Recognizing that objectives would change with regularity due to the ambiguity of the ultimate status of Kosovo, a Joint Planning Group (JPG) was established to prepare for decision points and conduct integrated planning in the field.^{xiv}

According to Chris Holshek, in *Lessons, from Kosovo: The KFOR Experience*, coordination efforts were built over the span of time, improving as the institutions matured and as staff realized that the majority of issues had impact across a broad swath of contributing organizations. Establishment of Civil-Military Coordination Centers (CIMIC) and a Humanitarian Community Information Center (HCIC) were extremely important to collaboration. CIMIC participated in the coordination of a broad spectrum of activities, from humanitarian relief to elections. As in Bosnia, the greatest success was achieved at the tactical level. NATO CIMIC doctrine was still non-existent. CIMIC reports proved extremely beneficial, informing both NATO and UNMIK of progress.^{xv}

The conduct of peace operations in Bosnia and Kosovo identified a number of existing challenges to the unity of effort between military and civilian institutions. Lack of

unity of effort undeniably lengthened the presence of military troops and international intervention.

Organizing for Unity of Effort in Reconstruction and Stabilization

Due to an intrinsic reluctance to commit to peacekeeping operations, the U.S. did not capitalize on the experiences of the military and civilian agencies and the lessons learned from each involvement were not systematically exploited for future use.^{xvi} The development of policies to institutionalize the capability to re-build government institutions and societies was thus impeded. Analysis of stability operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and a host of others could not but prove that achievement of unity of effort is a critical requirement for success.

The *2006 National Security Strategy* was clear in its intent to transform all agencies to meet international challenges of failed states as indicated by the goal of: “***Improving the capacity of agencies to plan, prepare, coordinate, integrate, and execute responses*** covering the full range of crisis contingencies and long-term challenges.”^{xvii} In effect, the President directed that his executive-level agencies display unity of effort through collaboration - strategically, operationally, and tactically. There are obvious strengths that exist within each of these agencies that could be lost in a unified command structure. As the examples in Bosnia and Kosovo demonstrated, challenges to unity of effort create critical vulnerabilities in multi-national peace operations. As directions have clearly been given to develop an interagency process to conduct operations that will most likely occur in a multi-national environment, then the goal must be unity of effort (through collaboration) versus unity of command.

The first attempt at organizing the non-military assets of the U.S. government to respond to peace operations occurred during the Clinton administration. Presidential Decision Directive-56 (PDD-56) *Managing Complex Contingency Operations* was issued in May 1997. It directed all U.S. government agencies to institutionalize lessons learned and to improve planning and management of contingency operations. Key components of this plan were the establishment of an Executive Committee (ExCom) to coordinate day-to-day management of contingency operations, development of a Political-Military Implementation Plan, and the development of training based on lessons learned.^{xviii} This directive never gained sufficient traction to be fully implemented for a variety of reasons. Those most pertinent to this discussion were the lack of clearly assigned leadership and the emphasis on a military model of planning. With the lead role given to the ExCom, there was no significant ownership for invigorating and advancing the process other than in times of crisis. While planning for contingency operations is clearly an imperative to success, the military model utilized was not an easy fit for the wide range of issues and agencies involved.^{xix} Additionally, there remained a lack of enthusiasm for accepting contingency operations as a U.S. priority and the change in administration ushered in a team that had even less inclination to tackle this problem.^{xx}

.....creating this capacity is no longer an issue of interagency debate. It's not a question of tension between the State Department, the Department of Defense, USAID and other agencies. We have come together to recognize that if we do not unify to create this capacity we are putting our national security at risk and that is unacceptable. We must have a uniform capacity to make this work.

Ambassador Carlos Pascual^{xxi}

Results in Afghanistan and Iraq led to a renewed desire by the current administration to enhance interagency coordination in relation to post-conflict reconstruction. President George W. Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44, *Management of*

Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, on December 7, 2005. Its stated purpose was to promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation of reconstruction and stabilization efforts in at-risk states or regions.^{xxii} Leadership was placed in the hands of the Secretary of State through the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). All agencies were directed to support this effort by cooperating with S/CRS and identifying and developing designated capabilities. The directive also required the Secretaries of State and Defense to integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans; and to develop a general framework for fully coordinating stabilization and reconstruction activities at all levels.^{xxiii}

In his initial press briefing Ambassador Carlos Pascual, the first Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, equated his office's role to creating a joint operations capability across civilian agencies and the military resulting in interoperability in any given theater. He emphasized relationships already pursued with the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, United States Agency for International Development, Center for Strategic and International Studies, U.S. Institute for Peace, other think-tanks, and NGOs.^{xxiv}

S/CRS' immediate priorities were developing a planning process capable of integration with military plans, building a trained staff, and collaborating with international partners.^{xxv} The resultant planning process was designed in collaboration with the military, which should allow plans to be phased and synchronized. However, it incorporated flexibility to address the unique characteristics of post-conflict civilian reconstruction operations. Highlights were situational analysis, policy formulation, strategy development, interagency implementation planning, an essential tasks matrix, and monitoring and evaluation.

A second critical component was the establishment of a Civilian Response Corps with an active component of 250 existing government employees across all agencies, a stand-by component of 2,000 government employees, and a reserve corps of civilians comparable to the military reserves, trained but only called to duty as needed.^{xxvi} Establishment of an experienced cadre of personnel with a wide variety of skills, many of which do not currently exist in the government, is vital to effective U.S. participation in future peace operations. Without this capability, civilian response and mobilization will remain slow and continue to be executed on an ad hoc basis. Planning without a response capability would be akin to building a bridge to nowhere. The third critical component was the development of international partnerships to establish institutional linkages and relationships necessary to leverage planning, divide roles and responsibilities, and organize in the theater of operations for maximal unity of effort.

The Department of Defense and the military, particularly the Army, have a keen interest in, and in fact would be the significant beneficiary of, the development of a civilian capacity with which to partner during the conduct of peace operations.^{xxvii} Military guidance is derived from Department of Defense Directive 3000.5, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTR)*. This directive clearly states that stability operations are a core U.S. military mission comparable to combat operations.^{xxviii} As in NSPD-44, this strong statement leaves no doubt that military-civilian integration is a requirement at all levels. The military is decisively committed to enabling the success of S/CRS and interagency cooperation, providing assistance in developing a planning model, training programs, and even funding. The military assigns personnel to work in S/CRS, aiding in interoperability and collaboration.

Ideally, under an interagency model in an actual operation, the military would enter a crisis to stop the fighting and separate combatants (if necessary) and to stabilize the situation and then return it to civil authority. With an effective civilian response capacity, the military would reduce forces relatively quickly, only maintaining those necessary for security, as civilian host nation forces were being trained and mobilized. Once the host nation security forces are re-established, the military would depart.

Recommendations:

The achievement of unity of effort in peace operations dictates a cohesive approach by all instruments of national power that must begin at the strategic level and from there extend to the operational and tactical level. While the primary focus of this paper is to address the operational level, improvements to operational capacity will only be effective if the strategic level is focused on providing the purpose and clear direction that leads the entire government toward unity of effort. For those involved in peace operations or in the study of peace operations, these recommendations should not be surprising. Many of them are already in some stage of implementation, but are still on shaky foundations not having been institutionalized or even funded in some cases. Concern remains that a new U.S. administration could abandon the established course of action.

U.S. Strategic

First, the President, as Commander-in-Chief, must employ the extensive array of tools at his command to develop clear policy and direct the use of all instruments of national power. He has the National Security Council (NSC) to inform and advise him on national security issues; a National Security Advisor (NSA) to manage the process; and a Cabinet responsible for the execution of policy. There is considerable flexibility in this process for the President to align it according to his management style, so there is no recommendation to

revise this institution. The National Security Council, at the strategic level, needs to commit to a comprehensive national strategy that anticipates participation in peace operations and ensures that the executive agencies have the capacity to carry it out. It is incumbent upon the Commander-in-Chief to establish clear intent and purpose and upon the NSA to ensure that all agencies understand the policy and their expected roles and responsibilities. If the NSC process fails to produce a cohesive and clear policy for individual peace operations, one can hardly expect the executive agencies to carry out a policy in a cohesive and integrated manner. Each member of the Cabinet must ensure that the agency they lead is prepared to execute the President's policy.

Second, the next administration should reaffirm the U.S. commitment to peace operations and to participation through a whole of government approach. Two successive administrations of different political parties have concluded that it is in the national security interest of the U.S. to commit resources to peace operations. Both concluded that to be successful, a coordinated interagency process is vital. The existing interagency process is defined in NSD-44, which assigns the Department of State as the lead agency and directs all agencies to coordinate with DOS.^{xxix} The course of action already underway may require refinements but the overall concept is sound. It would be counterproductive to scrap this process.

U.S. Operational

To date, a great deal of energy has gone into the development of S/CRS. S/CRS demonstrated the operational leadership and vision to manage the interagency process if it continues to have the authority of the President. In addition, it is building the tactical level capacity through the Civilian Reserve Corp to implement the plans. The S/CRS has yet to be

tested and is still a long way from fully owning the process. However, S/CRS is appropriately engaged and heading down a workable path to interagency and multi-national unity of effort in the theater.

First, planning is vital to efficient and effective execution of peace operations. S/CRS should fully implement its planning process to encompass the interagency. An obvious extension is the establishment of a joint planning group. Normally peace operations are an effort of a coalition of willing nations, either through the UN or an ad hoc arrangement. Plans must remain flexible to allow adaption to account for the composition of the coalition and take advantage of the strengths of partners.

Second, according to a Rand study, *Preparing the Army for Stability Operations*, DOS and USAID have taken significant actions to conduct planning and integrate operations. Unfortunately, the report card on other agencies is less encouraging. S/CRS must assert its leadership role and realistically evaluate each agency's capability to plan and deploy as part of a whole government effort. After which, S/CRS should then work together with these agencies to identify where and how to improve their capacity.^{xxx} Written Memorandum of Agreements must be established to spell out roles and responsibilities, coordination points, and expectations of performance for each agency or entity involved. Liaison officers alone are insufficient to institutionalize change or hold agencies accountable.

Third, DOD should turn Directive 3000.5 into joint doctrine. DOD has a well-defined planning process and experienced significant success in conducting the military aspect of stabilization operations. However, the military is not ideally suited to achieving the goals of the enabling civil authority in peace operations. To further the interagency process, DOD should continue their collaboration with DOS to establish an organizational structure

designed to maximize unity of effort in the theater of operation. The result should be a flexible organizational chart to be utilized in the operational theater that includes coordination centers for security, intelligence, information operations, humanitarian operations, planning cells and others as appropriate.

International Organizations

The U.S. should work in support and in concert with the UN Peacebuilding Commission established by UNSCR Resolution 1645 in December 2005.^{xxxix} Peace operations conducted utilizing the full participation of the UN and member states are less costly than unilateral action by the U.S. or by a U.S. led coalition. Increased engagement by the U.S. with S/CRS as the interlocutor should result in U.S. influence over the process to shape the structures of the institutions. In a briefing by the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission, member states, including the U.S., expressed continued support for the work of the commission although noting that it had been slower than expected.^{xxxix}

The continued goal is development of a cohesive strategy for peacebuilding and an integrated capacity to respond. The most difficult role is establishing clear, cohesive purpose for each operation. Given the collaborative nature of UN decisions and the negotiation of peace agreements, the results are normally ambiguous. The U.S. should ensure that for each operation a structure is in place at the strategic level that can provide clarity of intent and direction to the operational leaders on the ground. Clear strategic guidance in terms of goals and intent of operations is critical to the cohesive integration at the operational level between the military component and the civilian component.

At the operational level the design of the civilian institutions should be such that they are capable of coordinating with the military in areas essential to the promotion of unity of

effort. In line with the recommendation for U.S. civilian and military integrated operations, it should also include coordination centers for security, intelligence, information operations, humanitarian operations, planning cells and others as appropriate.

Conclusion

U.S. involvement in peace operations in the future is unavoidable. These operations will involve both military and civilian roles, as demonstrated by recent history. If these basic assumptions are accurate, then the U.S. is obligated to develop an integrated whole of government approach to participation in peace operations. NSDD-44 authorizes and directs the Department of State to lead the process of interagency involvement in peace operations through the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. To avoid the mistakes made in Afghanistan and Iraq, S/CRS must continue to evolve and must be given the resources to accomplish the mission.

Many assert that peace operations are best carried out by a coalition or multi-national organization. Statements by the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense, support the use of international coalitions and partnerships for peace operations. It is therefore in the best interest of the U.S. to work in concert with the UN and international partners to build the institutions in a manner that result in unity of effort. Unity of effort through collaboration must be the goal at all levels – strategic, operational, and tactical. Only then will peace operations be successful, efficient and effective.

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^{xxviii} U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, Washington, DC.

^{xxix} *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization. National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44*, 7 December 2005.

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